American Foreign Policy toward the Taliban in Afghanistan
I. Policy Proposal Summary
To mitigate (1) threats of regional instability and terrorism towards the U.S. and (2) prevent a widespread refugee crisis and famine, the U.S. and its allies should employ policies of diplomatic incentives and deterrent structures with the Taliban. The U.S. should use $7 billion in frozen assets and statehood recognition as levers of influence to implement fundamental reforms and counterterrorism measures in Afghanistan.
II.Context: the War on Terror and 2021 Withdrawal
The United States has tumultuous relations with Afghanistan — escalating in the early 2000s under the Bush Administration. The U.S. waged a two-decade long war on Afghan soil as a part of the Bush Administration’s ‘War on Terror.’ The global campaign set out to eliminate terrorism and punish those responsible for the events on September 11th, 2001.
Over time criticism mounted regarding the U.S.’s role overseas; the war had cost the U.S. trillions of dollars, resulted in thousands of American body bags, damaged American international credibility, and increased public distrust, all with arguably little to show for it. Additionally, national sentiment placed pressure on the American government to get the U.S. out of yet another quagmire. Subsequently, in August of 2021, nearing the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, the Biden Administration underwent complete withdrawal. This move was congruent with shifting nationalist and isolationist American sentiments — Biden asserting withdrawal marked an end to the “era of major military operations to remake other countries,” (Biden 2021). 11 days following the poorly executed withdrawal, the Taliban overthrew the capital with little resistance (Santhanam 2021). The Taliban are an Islamic fundamentalist group that were founded and operate in Afghanistan. They held power in the late 1990s and imposed extremist Islamic rule characterized by strict and total control over the people. Although they were ousted from power during the US invasion in 2001, they continued to operate in certain regions until they overthrew the standing Afghan government in 2021. Since then, the country has undergone an extreme crises despite promises that the modern Taliban is not the same as the Taliban of the 1990s.
Today, the country is experiencing severe economic fall out. Despite claims of less radical rule relative to its previous regime, the rights and respect for women has dramatically declined since the Taliban toppled the capital. Today, women are almost entirely shut away from work, travel, school, and public life. The Taliban additionally barred women from aid groups — many of which rely on women to effectively operate Afghan health care systems and food aid (Goldbaum & Rahim 2023). This winter further devastated the Afghan people — a population which is at risk of famine. According to the World Food Program, only two percent of Afghans have enough food.
III. Challenges and Threat to the United States
For the U.S., Taliban control of Afghanistan immediately after withdrawal poses several threats, prompting response and action to mitigate international risks and catastrophic crises. As part of withdrawal, the U.S. intended for Afghan authorities to uphold counterterrorism measures. However, immediate collapse leaves the region fertile ground for terrorist activity.
Taliban control poses several security threats. First, the Taliban has historically close relations to terrorist organizations, for instance, Al Qaeda, — the motive of American intervention in the first place. Prior to U.S. withdrawal, the Trump Administration and the Taliban signed the Doha agreement — ‘a peace treaty’ in which the U.S. committed to pull out of Afghanistan in exchange for assurance that the Taliban will prevent terrorists from operating on Afghan soil. However, according to the U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, the Taliban have ‘grossly’ violated the terms of Doha. For instance, the Taliban sheltered Al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri — one of the FBI’s most wanted terrorists since 9/11 (Blinken 2022). Zawahiri orchestrated 9/11 with Bin Laden and has since been the mastermind behind attacks at several U.S. embassies. The U.S. located Zawahiri in Kabul and conducted an air strike that killed him in 2022. Additionally, ISIS-K, an extremist militant group founded in 2015, has been operating and expanding within Afghan borders (Epstein 2023, 3). U.S. intelligence shows that ISIS-K, an extremist militant, has been responsible for dozens of deadly attacks since the government collapse in 2021. According to U.S. general Michael Kurilla, at its current pace, ISIS-K will soon have the capacity to strike American interests.
The United Nations (UN) and American officials are concerned that, under Taliban rule, Afghan soil is a “safe haven” for terrorists — facilitating operations that threaten regional and international security. According to the 2020 CFR Contingency Memorandum, the connections between Taliban and terrorist activity plus the volatility of the state is fertile ground for terrorist threats. The Taliban has little to no control over rural areas and mounting crises brews desperation which “gives terrorist groups relative freedom within which to operate and provides a pool of potential recruits,” (Jones 2020). Afghanistan remains a ‘strategic node’ for Al-Qaeda. Blinken and American officials are concerned that Zawahiri is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of terrorist activity in Afghanistan.
The second major challenge for the U.S. is the mounting humanitarian crises and widespread poverty. According to the UN, more than 3.5 million citizens are displaced due to conflict, with numbers rising due to economic collapse and famine (UNHRC 2023). The U.S. has diplomatic relations with every country in the Middle East (except Iran) as well as vested economic interest with many neighboring countries. The humanitarian crisis has potential to destabilize the region, straining resources and disrupting trade. The Taliban is unequipped to manage collapsing economies and the crisis which has led to more than 2.7 million Afghan refugees.
With economic collapse in sight, the mounting crises require external support to achieve stability. Without intervention, perpetual refugee overflow by the millions will overburden and damage international and U.S. economic and trading systems.
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IV. Policy Solutions
American leaders should respond to the challenges and threat in Afghanistan through diplomatic incentives and deterrent structures for the Taliban. First, in coordination with international allies and the UN, the U.S. should negotiate with Taliban leaders, employing incentives to implement fundamental reforms towards (1) respect for women’s rights (2) counterterrorist measures and (3) facilitation of aid to mitigate widespread poverty in the region (Thomas 2023, 11).
The U.S. and its allies have influence over the Taliban that can be used to improve security measures in the region and mitigate threats facing the U.S.. Firstly, the Biden Administration has a hold on assets of the Afghan central bank (DAB). The $7 billion was frozen after the Afghan government collapsed to thwart the Taliban from getting their hands on the money for individual gain. In 2022, the Biden Administration asserted $3.5 billion of the funds would be released through an ‘Afghan Fund.’ According to Department of State spokesman Ned Price, the fund is characterized by “targeted disbursements… to help provide greater stability to the Afghan economy,” (Price 2023). However, as of 2023, no disbursements have been made.
The U.S. government should allocate monthly allotments of the funds, contingent on an agreement negotiated prior with the Taliban. Funding will only be released under preconditions that the money has safeguards as well as oversight and auditing from an IO. In transferring the funds back to Afghanistan in smaller increments, the U.S. can monitor the impact on the economy and whether the Taliban has loopholes to launder funds.
The policy should firstly prioritize counterterrorism measures because it is the more immediate threat to U.S. interests. As another incentive, the U.S. and its allies could include statehood recognition in negotiations subject to meeting improved human rights requirements and rights of women.
Negotiating lesser restrictions on the Afghan people would be effective in improving the functioning of society. For instance, women would be able to return to health care and aid work to help suffering families. Fundamental reforms would help reinstate a credible press and uplift citizens through education. This approach could be more effective in improving human rights for the Afghan people.
Negotiations for reform are the most plausible and most effective approach to mitigate threats towards the U.S. while improving regional instability. Engagement of military intervention is a non-starter for many Americans and members of Congress. By the time Biden took office, support for Afghanistan plummeted to levels below even Vietnam during its worst years (Shortridge 2021).
The Taliban assert they are owed the assets and demand access to stabilize their financial sector. Initially, the U.S. hoped that the frozen funds alone would be an effective enough bargaining chip for the regime to undergo some fundamental reforms. However, terrorist activity has not deterred and the crises in Afghanistan have worsened in the almost two years since. A stalemate approach alone is ineffective.
It’s important for American leaders to take into account the lack of credibility and reliability of the Taliban. They’ve continuously gone back on promises, for instance, pledging greater respect for women’s rights or breaking commitments of the Doha Agreement. Despite assertions of less extremist rules, they’ve reinstated corporal punishment such as public lashings, amputations, and executions. It goes without saying, the Taliban are both a volatile and unpredictable actor which requires negotiations to include regulation, insurance, and contingency plans. Opponents to this policy assert that diplomacy and negotiations with the Taliban legitimize their power in the region. There is also concern that the money, despite anti-laundering and monitoring measures, will fall into the laps of terrorists and extremist groups — counterproductive to its initial goals.
However, Kissinger’s idea brings to light the justification behind open and diplomatic communication with the Taliban. Based on principles of realpolitik, foreign policy is driven by the pursuit of power and security. Therefore, isolating the Taliban as an adversary based on ideological or past conflict undermines the U.S.’s end goal of counterterrorist and stabilization measures in the region. This is not to be confused with engaging as trusted allies; instead, Kissinger’s school of thought proposes using power politics and Taliban fragility as a lever of influence (Kissinger 1957).
V. Influential Actors
Congress is a highly influential actor in foreign policy towards Afghanistan, particularly regarding allocation of funding. Congressional Democrats have expressed support for Biden to release the assets without conditions and to lift sanctions on the Afghan government. 48 legislators signed a letter, pushed by Democrat Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal and Sara Jacobs, calling on Biden to take action before the crisis and collapse decimate the country. They highlighted in the letter that the money belongs to the Afghan people and does not come from American taxpayer dollars. Holding it back is criminal to the millions of Afghans braving the winter without food or aid.
However, other members might have more reservations about this recommended policy. Republicans typically take an extremely hard line on terrorism. Therefore, Republican congresspeople might be skeptical of any policy with risk of benefiting these groups. As the current majority party, these actors could hinder the policy from effectively succeeding,
Lastly, American nationalists and public opinion also pose a hindrance to this recommended policy. As the war in Afghanistan progressed, public opinion sharply declined in support of intervention. The Trump Administration marked a high in nationalist and isolationist sentiment with Americans supporting withdrawal from international agreements and disengagement from treaties. According to Walter Mead, the values of this ‘Jacksonian Tradition’ emphasize ‘America First.’ This group also is traditionally opposed to “foreign do-gooding…and stands in opposition of humanitarian intervention,” (Mead 1999, 8). Therefore, this pool of public opinion would likely express dissent towards further engagement in Afghanistan and extended ventures of humanitarianism.
After 20 years of engagement in Afghanistan, it’s in the U.S.’s best interest economically and in relation to security to engage in diplomacy with the Taliban and responsibly return the Afghan reserves to help alleviate the widespread poverty and economic decline.