Strategy Briefs: Can you save Putin?
Strategy Brief I: Military Statecraft
To mitigate NATO’s presence and cease Ukraine membership talks, Putin must dually act through both assurant, positive engagement and deterrence. To demilitarize Ukraine, Russia will present a greater net benefit to the U.S. and its allies. Putin will subsequently allocate choice to NATO through a deterrent military operation on Ukraine’s eastern border.
Positive engagement is a more viable approach than direct threat— the shadow of the future with NATO is grounds to avoid aggravating members. Putin must directly appease the U.S. — an authoritative leader in NATO and global hegemon. Russia maintains close allyship with Iran and was instrumental in the 2015 nuclear deal – which was disbanded by the U.S. due to Iranian noncompliance. As a result of Iran’s dependence and Putin’s influence, Russia will resolve the existing stalemate, facilitating cooperation and compliance again contingent on NATO rolling back. This “weighs the genuine interests of one’s country” presenting military tradeoffs of net benefit to the U.S. and global security (Lauren 177). While this poses relative military gain to the U.S., this is favorable for Russia as subsequent reduced sanctions will bolster Russian capacity. More frequent interaction with NATO via nuclear negotiation will additionally enlarge the shadow of the future (Axelrod 16).
Secondly, Russia will aggregate forces bordering the Donbas region. If, within the 60 day window, NATO ceases relations regarding membership and rolls back, Putin will disband forces. If not, troops will mobilize to liberate ethnic Russians following the 60 day period. Schelling argues that the goal of threat is to “give somebody a choice,” (74). The time window and commitment ties Russian hands and establishes NATO can avoid harm. This action is “credible and sufficiently potent” based on Russia's success in the annexation of Crimea and regional military superiority (Lauren 178).
Security Brief II: Economic Statecraft
The Russian economy is eroding under the pressure from sanctions imposed by NATO and its allies — facing the collapse of the Ruble, skyrocketing inflation, and a moribund population. Despite the onerous sanctions Russia is burdened with, Putin can avoid collapse and persevere in the Ukraine by (1) exploiting weak EU allies to alleviate oil sanctions (2) expanding export client base (3) flipping public opinion and applying pressure domestically, and (4) establishing credibility with military compellence.
First, Russia will leverage weaknesses of Western allies to ease sanctions’ ubiquity. Sanctions have domestic ramifications for instigating countries — namely spiking food and energy prices. In light of sanctions and Covid, Germany asserts they are heading towards a severe economic crisis. Putin must open communication with countries like Germany — a country dependent on Russia energy exports that recently invested in infrastructure to import oil. Putin must remain irreplaceable as a trade partner (Hirschman). Russia will sell oil to these European countries at a lower price than in 2021 for one year. Secondly, if these countries do not ease oil sanctions within 30 days, Russia will indelibly shift their import market to countries like China, India, and Turkey. Third, if this agreement is met, Putin will halt expansion into Ukraine — opening negotiation and diplomacy to establish peace and draw the line of Russia territory at currently occupied regions. To ensure success, this carrot and stick approach requires credibility — a result of “binding oneself and circumventing an adversary's commitments,” (Baldwin 106). After a 30 day window, Russia is on standby to deconstruct oil infrastructure connecting to Germany and other European countries. To further cement credibility, Putin must actively expand to new markets. This in turn prevents China from taking advantage of and profiting from the isolated market. By expanding the scope of import clientele, demand theory asserts the price of Russian oil will steadily rise.
Further, EU sanctions must be unanimously approved by member states; if Russia can appeal to enough fragile nations, Putin can thwart multilateral sanctions and ultimately undermine the impact of U.S. sanctions. The U.S. is far less connected to Russian oil than Europe, making European countries preferred candidates. While it may seem counterintuitive to establish trade with adversaries of the Kremlin’s cause, Baldwin asserts that it is often, “even during wartime, economically justifiable,” (109).
Next, Putin can utilize his powerful information systems to portray Russian economic viability — thus provoking internal pressure against sanctions. As seen in Moscow’s hand in 2016 U.S. elections, Putin will use sources to disseminate (mis)information and turn public opinion against sanctions. Moscow must push the narrative that Russia’s economy is salient, sanctions are ineffective, and they “impose economic hard on innocent civilians of instigating countries,” (Drezner 2). Mounting internal pressure on leaders will decrease the lifespan of sanctions and revitalize economic capacity in the Ukraine.
This multistep approach pins adversarial actors against each other and fortifies Russian capacity as a global power and trading partner.
Security Brief III: Diplomacy / combination statecraft
Over a year and three months into the invasion, Russia finds itself in an inauspicious position. Because of the manner in which the world has come to Ukraine's aid, as well as the unanticipated solidarity of NATO, Russia must incorporate diplomacy statecraft before the collapse of its operation. Putin’s existing course of action is untenable; said course will erode Russian resolve and inflate international contempt. First, the central goals are to (1) soften Western sanctions, (2) maintain jurisdiction over the Donbas territory, and (3) cease discussion of Ukraine NATO membership.
To achieve these targets, Putin will employ a compellent, three-pronged approach of military, economic, and diplomatic statecraft. First, Russia will extend communication to jumpstart multilateral diplomacy with Ukraine while roping in actors in the Normandy format, the United States, China, and other NATO allies. Ukraine’s lack of incentive or trust to engage in bilateral diplomacy calls for a multilateral approach. Also because conflict involves a multitude of actors who fiscally and materially support Ukraine, Russia must involve them.
Reputation shapes the perception of a state’s resolve and is pivotal in achieving diplomatic success (Sartori 121). As a bordering rogue state, this is a challenge facing Putin and achieving favorable ends. Due to Russia’s lack of legitimacy and a severed reputation, supplemental actors increase commitments and reduce manipulation from a Ukrainian perspective. This is additionally why Putin factors in Normandy format members — a diplomatic group composed of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France. The group convened to achieve peace resolutions in the 2014 conflict in eastern Ukraine, successfully establishing weaponry withdrawal, prisoner exchange, and open lines of communication between Russia and Ukraine. With little credibility to draw on, the Normandy format is an important function of the ad hoc conference. States generate reputation on past actions; despite other blunders, at least diplomatically Putin can point towards his concessions at Normandy to augment his reputation to adversaries. Moscow must also have a heavy hand in coordinating and leading the ad hoc conference. As a leader, Putin has greater influence and maximizes advantage in negotiation (Berridge 157).
Putin will conduct negotiation from a ‘carrot and stick’ approach — employing both incentives and threats to coerce other actors. Russia will recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state and ceasefire contingent on a bottom line resistance point. From Ukraine, Russia wants to maintain jurisdiction of its existing territory in the Donbas region in which referendums will stand. From NATO, Putin requires they ease sanctions and conclude discussions of membership with Ukraine.
If states fail to cooperate, Russia will have few choices but to engage in further security and defense building, or in other words, nuclear build up and increased arms dealing with Iran. While Putin will not explicitly state intent to go nuclear in the Ukraine war, he will assert further development of national security and nuclear defense arsenals. The strategy, a form of compellence, is to have a strong enough threat of harm to ‘win’, without ever actually putting them to use (Schelling 70). Drawing from North Korean strategies, Putin can even initiate ‘nuclear testing’ to demonstrate credibility and resolve. If terms are agreed upon, however, Russia will no longer be required to engage in arms deals and close military ties with Iran. Putin will go as far as to terminate nuclear dealings with Iran for a five year period. Currently, Russia engages in arms dealings and military compensation which is a threat to international security and the actors engaged in the Russo-Ukrainian diplomatic initiative. This approach poses potential risk as Western allies do not respond favorably to nuclear threats. Thus, Putin must conscientiously dance the line of a believable but not overly alarming threat.
Compellent military statecraft is an important angle of successful negotiation because it ties military threats to Russia’s diplomatic objectives. This also “weighs the genuine interests of one’s country” presenting tradeoffs of net benefit to the U.S. and countries threatened by Iran (Lauren 177).
Second, Russia must engage in reciprocal concessions with countries who imposed existing sanctions. Upon negotiation, Russia will put forth a strategic good: oil. Prior to the invasion, Russia was a major supplier of oil to European countries and the U.S., who have imposed hefty sanctions on Moscow. Sanctions have domestic ramifications for instigating countries — namely spiking inflation and a global energy crisis. Upon lifting sanctions, Russia will renegotiate an oil treaty in which Russia will sell oil for one year at existing discounted rates currently extended to China and India. This is a ‘Russian carrot’, or concession, for other countries: cheap oil and immediate deescalation in return for lighter sanctions. In the short run, this is a cost for Russia. In the long-run, however, exporting oil will improve the sustainability of the (currently feeble) Russian economy.
The Russian diplomatic solution to the Russo-Ukrainian war targets the genuine interests of each country, offering a concession on one hand and threat on the other. From the diplomatic front, involving the Normandy Format boosts Russian reputation and demonstrates commitment. Economically, oil deals entice leaders feeling heat from domestic politics. Militarily, countries are incentivized to weaken Iranian capability and de-escalate threats of nuclear harm. A comprehensive, three-pronged approach ensures withdrawal terms lean favorably to Putin and Russian objectives.