Right-Wing Populism in Democracies: The United States, France, and England
Introduction
“Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs will be made to benefit American workers and American families. We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs,” pronounced former U.S. President Donald J. Trump in his inauguration speech, demonstrating the worrying trend towards populism globally (Trump 2016).
Problématique
In the early 20th century, dictatorial overthrows and coups were the forefront threat to democracy. Today, conversely, democracies flounder more gradually, often as a result of populists at the ballot boxes. Recently, right-wing populists have thrown a wrench into political landscapes in post-industrial democracies across the globe. In Europe, the average share of the populist vote has more than doubled since the 1960s (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). When does right-wing and extreme populism flourish and why? What are the main drivers of right-wing populist movements?
This paper delves into the mainly demand-side drivers of right-wing populist movements in the 21st century. The emergence of populist leaders and movements is by no means a new phenomenon, but instead, a recurring reaction to change or recession throughout history. However, contemporary movements have seen unprecedented success at the polls. Thus, this paper focuses on recent movements in the United States, England, and France. It highlights common factors between these three different political landscapes
that triggered such widespread, electorally successful movements. Rather than one core driver, this paper attributes the ascendance of right-wing populism to class, employment and wealth cleavages, and sociocultural progression that threaten and agitate people that gravitate towards populist rhetorics.
Extremist and authoritarian-populism is threatening the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Parties and actors manipulate and utilize the vulnerability and emotions of their constituents — making citizen behavior volatile, distrusting, and disgruntled. The rhetoric and practices of right-wing populists works to undermine public confidence in democracy and thus threaten its principles. This explains why it is important to address the triggers of these counter-movements. It’s useful in turn to mitigate the risks of antidemocratic growth and avoid future threats to legitimate democracy.
The structure of the paper will be broken down into four sections. I will delve into the ascendance of populism and political landscape first in the United States, followed by England and France. Each section will highlight common factors between the three cases. The fourth section will encompass critiques of the demand-side explanations and propose mitigation strategies.
Terms
This paper analyzes the geneses of current right-wing extremist and populist movements. To properly explore these trends occurring in post-industrial countries, it’s critical to define right-wing populism and associated terms. Right-wing populism is a typically reactionary political ideology that challenges the legitimate authority of the state. It’s rooted in an “us-versus-them” worldview: the idea that existing political systems neglect or actively oppose the interest of the people (Berman 2020). Often right-wing populist are threatened by social or cultural change and thus work to defend a particular race, identity, or way of life. Parties are often organized around a charismatic leader that employs demagogy: defined as political activity that seeks support by exciting emotions and appealing to desires rather than rational argumentation and policy. Movements in Europe traditionally oppose immigration and are Eurosceptic, or critical of the EU and European integration. Economically, populists often champion protectionism, the theory of protecting a country’s domestic industries against the foreign competition through tariffs, restrictions, and subsidies (Hudson 2022). It’s important to note that populism is not exclusively extreme or right-wing, however, for the purpose of this essay we will examine this demographic. This essay will delve into the demand-side origins of right-wing populism, which is characterized by bottom-up, individual based explanations. These factors are driven by the public’s values and beliefs. Conversely, supply-side causation provides top-down explanations that the main influence is the decline in the nature of democracy itself (Berman 2020, 73).
The United States: Donald Trump’s Right-Wing Populist Ideology and steadfast following
Trump’s appeal to economic grievance
The United States adeptly exemplifies the demand-side drivers that gave rise to the influx of right-wing populists at the ballot boxes for Trump in 2016. On the economic front, U.S. employment and class cleavages induce resentment and public dissatisfaction among lower middle class Americans. This shift, coupled with sociocultural changes such as large immigrant flows and rapid generational progression in social values and cultural norms, pose threats to this demographic. These concerns are acknowledged and capitalized upon by Trump and his populist constituents which attributes to his appeal and electoral success in 2016.
From the economic vantage point, populist rhetoric is appealing to lower middle-income Americans who have historically emerged as the “losers” of post-industrialization and service economy shifts (Kurer & Palier 2019). This is exactly the verbiage Trump employed to assemble his supporters.
The economic dissatisfaction and insecurity experienced by lower middle class Americans explains the current ascendance of populism, particularly in the United States. There has been a large increase in the wealth inequality, creating distinct cleavages between classes. Between 1989 and 2016, the wealth gap between the richest and poorest families has more than doubled. Even more jarring, the top one percent possesses more wealth than the middle 60 percent of American families (U.S. Census Bureau 2021).
This trend partially emerged as a result of globalization, in which many developed countries underwent a process of ‘deindustrialization:’ a “natural outcome of the process of successful economic development,” (Piersen p. 544, 2011). Amidst this transition, technology and service-based jobs became central to the economy, creating the need for “a more highly skilled workforce with a greater diversity of skills,” (Barr 2012). Essentially, education and human capital became important assets required to be adequately employed in most cases, marginalizing unskilled, blue-collar, and routine laborers. Described by some scholars (Inglehart & Norris) as “left-behinds,” this group experiences slow job growth and stagnant wages that make them the “most vulnerable to the call of authoritarian populism.”
This economic shift, coupled with the recession in 2008, made life more insecure for the working and middle class while benefiting the highly-educated, skilled individuals in the labor market. The global recession also increased citizen’s susceptibility to these movements which address their anxieties and provide a scapegoat for their circumstance — immigrants, foreign countries, minorities, and the elite. Studies show that the financial crises of the past thirty years are a catalyst for right-wing populist movements (Funke 2016, 232). This is highlighted in the considerable increase in votes and seats held by populists following the crises in the 1920s and after 2008. This essentially lays the foundation of the current economically polarized society in the U.S., resulting in resentment and dissatisfaction from the routine-labor, less skilled workers. These defined ‘losers’ of globalization and economic transition are thus prone to more extreme rhetoric and susceptible to the populist narrative (Grande et al. 2008).
Trump’s campaign was an embodiment of the demands from this struggling demographic. He promised to return America to its former greatness by restoring manufacturing jobs, restricting immigration, and implementing protectionist policy. According to Norris, his aggressive methods, promises to restore a “bygone era”, and appeal towards the silent majority is particularly “appealing to older, religious, white men in rural communities, especially social conservatives and xenophobes,” (Norris & Inglehart 2019). These citizens felt neglected by the prior administrations who struggled to uplift rural and manufacturing-centered communities. Dissatisfied with back-to-back democratic administrations, people often look the opposite way for change. Trump was a materialization of these demands from citizens. He was able to leverage this vulnerability and brewing anger. His campaign was centered on ‘America First’, voicing directly to “the forgotten men and women of our country” that they “will never be ignored again,” (Trump 2016). Historically, economically insecure people seek out heavy handed leadership to protect them, aligning with his style and increasing his political appeal.
The correlation between cultural backlash and populist successes
The second main driver of populist growth is attributed to the cultural backlash thesis, in which Trump’s campaign appealed to the disdain of social change like the election of a black president and value shifts (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, 26). According to the PEW Research Center, 85 percent of the populist right are white, only two of ten of which graduated college (PEW 2021). Socioculturally, Trump appeals to older generations who are threatened by cultural shifts by promising protection and a return to tradition. Through the last century, the U.S. has undergone enormous social change. Gay marriage was passed into law. Women are breaking down oppressive gender norms and making strides toward gender equality. With each new generation, Americans have increased their post-material values including sexual freedom, tolerance, and environmentalism (Inglehart 1977). Since 1965, immigration has more than quadrupled and the majority of the U.S. population is expected to be nonwhite by the middle of the 21st century (Berman 2020, 75).
Trump’s campaign promises are notably congruent to these cultural trends, directly appealing to the perception of threat among white conservative Americans. While trivial, Trump bringing back ‘Merry Christmas’ to the White House as opposed to ‘Happy Holidays’ perfectly encapsulates his appeal to white Americans who long for the return to Trump’s Great America. Policy-wise, in response to immigration backlash, Trump pledged to construct a wall on the border between Mexico and the U.S. to stop the Mexican ‘criminals and rapists.’ Once in office, he implemented Executive Order 13769 — a travel ban on people from Muslim-majority countries and Syrian refugees. Many of his narratives and action items during his campaign and presidency directly appealed to the increased perception of threat. This is incredibly enticing to his followers — many view changes to traditional hierarchies as threatening and yearn for a society like that of which they were born into (Berman 2020, 75). Some (Berman) argue that the election of the first African American president made the shifting power dynamics more prominent. When he was born, many states were segregated and African Americans were blatantly oppressed by society and the government. In 2008, Barack Obama, a black man, held the most powerful position in the country. Obama’s election was followed by a counter-wave of identity politics, meaning more groups politically emerged based on the identity of race, religion, and social background. This instance of minority representation “reinforced a sense of loss and disempowerment by white working-class voters... whose previously dominant social status was being challenged by the growing diversity of the country,” (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019, 137).
Some scholars (Norris & Inglehart) perceive the economic grievance and cultural backlash interchangeably as playing off each other within populist ideologies. Often xenophobia and racism rise in the U.S. during economic lows. This is because immigrants and global economies are an easy scapegoat for economic stagnation. This is again exemplified in Trump’s rhetoric that immigrants are stealing the jobs of hard working Americans.
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The delegitimization of institutions and hateful speech perpetuated by Trump is extremely dangerous because it asserts that democracy is fraudulent. Additionally, his xenophobic and racist rhetoric affirms and inspires fears amongst his supporters. Studies found a causal and measurable link between reports of hate crime and extremist activity and Trump’s language. According to data drawn from the U.S. HEAT1 map, counties that hosted Trump rallies had a 226 percent increase in hate crimes (Feinberg 2019).
Populist success at the polls and the normalization of these resentful beliefs by the president of the United States induces democratic backsliding. Trump asserts that he is the only person able to ‘drain the swamp’ of corrupt politicians and lobbyists and discredits election processes. Distrust in institutions manifests in dangerous ways, for instance, on January 6th, in which his followers attacked the U.S. capitol on false claims that the election was stolen. This minority demographic of supporters showed up strongly at the polls, perpetuating a false sense of national support. The erosion of democracy perpetuated by these extreme groups is a danger to post-industrial nations beyond the U.S., particularly in the UK and France.
England and Brexit
Persistent structural unemployment opens the window for populist wins in England
Parallel economic and socio-cultural reactions arose in Britain, manifesting in public Euroscepticism and Brexit as well as the rise of the populist United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).
In June of 2016, the Brexit referendum vote moved that Britain leave the EU, highlighting the success of the nationalist and populist agenda in England. Economically, Brexit emerged from structural job loss, perceived neglect from JAMs3, and mounting frustration of the economic environment. Starting nearly 50 years prior to Brexit, political discontent steadily rose and public trust plummeted. Like in the U.S., citizens became fed up with the stationary economic situation caused by structural changes and recession.
Britain was at the center of the industrial revolution and thus many towns were established with an industrial base. In the mid-1960s, manufacturing accounted for 30 percent of all employment. In 2019, manufacturing jobs were a mere 7.7 percent of the workforce (Beatty 2020). Similar to the Rust Belt in the U.S., the evolving economy and impact of deindustrialization birthed economic insecurity for many working citizens. These areas emerged in political debate as ‘left behind places,’ or localized regions mainly in the North and Southwest that were struck hard by recession and deindustrialization (Kurer & Palier 2019). The longer this demographic feels neglected, the more desperate and frustrated they become with the system and existing policy. Thus, they are susceptible to radical populist ideas that play off of their emotions and appeal to the grievances that are neglected by incumbent politicians.
This explains why support for Leave was disproportionately high in
these areas. The localized perception of neglect was “ripe for mobilization via the Leave campaign’s call to ‘take back control’ and regain sovereignty,” (Kiefel & Osuna 2021). England particularly reflects the dichotomy between the winners and losers of globalization. The educated and service-sector workers largely benefited from globalization and EU membership, such as lower costs of production, imports, and investment. Meanwhile, low middle income citizens faced the repercussions of the ‘race to the bottom,’ with many subject to foreclosure of their homes. On top of existing economic dissatisfaction, many scholars (Kiefel & Osuna) attribute the financial crisis as the tipping point that allowed for populist actors and parties to seize power and seats. In 2016, only 26 percent of low income citizens expressed trust in the government (Kiefel & Osuna 2021). This opening and unmet demands allowed UKIP to gain power in parliament. UKIP, a populist libertarian party, bases their platform on Euroscepticism and anti-immigration. They assert that they fight the real and forgotten Brits, a noticeably congruent narrative to Trump’s. UKIP’s demagogic narrative was reflected in the polls; in 2015 liberal democrats lost 49 seats while support for UKIP soared (Norris & Inglehart 2019, 26). At the turn of the century, UKIP emerged in the political playing field, garnering 7 percent of the vote. By 2014, they gained one third of the parliament seats. UKIP, like Trump, promised to save taxpayers and get immigration under control. They additionally successfully gained support for Brexit in asserting the EU only benefited the elite, allowed immigrants to take their jobs, and disproportionately taxed the middle class. It’s important to highlight the striking similarities between supporters for UKIP and Brexit, and the populist movement in the U.S. UKIP and Brexit supporters have significant demographic similarities to Trump supporters. Many British supporters wanted greater national power and control than existed under EU conditions. This demographic unsurprisingly consists heavily of older, white men with a secondary education (Stokes 2020).
Immigration to the UK and Cultural Backlash
The second main driver of the reactionary populist wave, like the in the U.S., was the influx of immigrants and the shift towards post-material values (Inglehart). Out of many EU countries, England particularly has seen rising immigration, the decline of traditional values, and challenges toward gender structures. Rapid progression, as seen after Obama’s
4 Leave is a term to describe the movement to withdraw from the EU.
Dahlin 8 presidency in the U.S., is often met with a counter-reaction which explains the ascendance of populist parties in the UK. There is strong evidence to support the claim that sociocultural change caused the counter-wave of populism in England, attributed to both the high levels of immigration and the manner in which it was weaponized by populist parties. England attracts migrants from many Commonwealth countries, ranging from Northern Africa to Southeast Asia. In 2015, the Syrian refugee crisis displaced millions of people, pushing over 1.3 million asylum seekers into Europe. According to the United Nations, by the end of 2018 there were 126,720 refugees in the UK (Refugee Action 2022). The UK pledged to resettle 20,000 Syrians by 2020 through the Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Policy. UKIP officially held the position that they would comply with the UN humane integration and asylum system, however their actions were strongly opposed (Calhoun 2020). Leaders asserted in a number of debates that the government should put its own, struggling classes above foreign groups.
Changes to the ethic makeup and hierarchy brew resentment, specifically during difficult economic times (Berman 2022, 75). The increased perception of threat further pushes people to favor their ‘group,’ which is why populist voter makeup is particularly homogenous and identity-based. The nationalistic aspect to populism is driven by rhetoric that vilifies immigrants as the source of economic misfortunes. Former leader of UKIP Nigel Farage, employs demagogy and appeals to the emotions of the working class to garner support. "In scores of our cities and market towns, this country in a short space of time has frankly become unrecognizable... Whether it is the impact on local schools and hospitals, whether it is the fact that in many parts of England you don't hear English spoken any more. This is not the kind of community we want to leave to our children and grandchildren," (Sparrow 2014).
There is a strong correlation between the economic grievance and the uptick in nationalist and xenophobic values in the UK. UKIP and right wing leaders like Farage employ scapegoatism to sympathize with the economic shortcomings of citizens. So, when Brexit was on the agenda, populist framed it as a way to return the country to a disillusioned former glory. Support for Brexit embodied the perceived threat to national identity and was manifestly a vote against multiculturalism and for English Nationalism,” (Calhoun 2020, 50). Drawing parallels, this again is similar to Trump’s MAGA narrative of ‘Merry Christmas’ instead of ‘Happy Holidays.’
Marie Le Pen, the National Front, and populist surges
Disaffected French citizens of the economic recession
The ascendance of UKIP and the prominence of a charismatic leader in the U.S. draw similarities to the growth of right-wing populism in France in the late 2010s. The National Front (FN) and Marine Le Pen played off of the fear of immigrants and the enduring economic insecurity of the working class. The demagogic strategy garnered support at the polls and spread Euroscepticism. In 2017, FN leader Marine Le Pen ran for president. In the election, she won 21.3 percent of the vote. In the subsequent run-off against Macron, she received 33.9 percent of the vote (Ivaldi 2019). Right-wing populism gained appeal as a result of disaffection with the political status quo. According to a comparative study conducted in EU countries, in 2017 France had the second-most disaffected and discouraged voters. Further, more than 40 percent of French voters showed low confidence in the government, asserting they do not see anything improving in the next five years (Friedman 2017). This dissatisfaction was fertile ground for right-wing populist to gain support. Le Pen and FN actively addressed the stressors and demands of disaffected French, using emotional and arousing diction in the process. According to Ivaldi, economic grievances and feelings of economic alienation are the driving force behind “electoral revitalization of the radical right in France,” (Invaldi 2019, 12). Taking off in 2008, the financial crisis was the worst recession since the end of World War II in France (Ivaldi 2019, 11). When many were facing economic insecurity and in need of social assistance, the government simultaneously aimed to reduce the nation’s large deficit with austerity packages. These proved unpopular among the French, specifically during deep economic lows. Le Pen and right-wing populists seized the opportunity in the demand for change. Her campaign platform took a hard-like on immigration and protectionism. Like Trump, her campaign and party appealed to the economic losers of globalization. Her manifesto, similar to the vast majority of populist movements, acknowledges the majorité silencieuse: the forgotten and abandoned by the elite. Not coincidentally, 40 percent of Le Pen’s supporters expressed confidence in Trump — nearly three times the approval compared to non-FN members. Similar to May and Johnson’s push for Brexit, right-wing populist parties in France doubled down on protectionist policy goals. FN’s Eurosceptic values staunchly opposed integration and globalization. Le Pen’s manifesto aimed to “restore national sovereignty over laws, borders, and currency” (Ivaldi 2019, 12). She ardently opposed TAFTA and CETA trade agreements. She called EU membership a “nightmare” France must emerge from to become free again. This language is identifiable with populist rhetoric across decades and governments; the current environment is a nightmare in which only their party can save the honest people from.
Supply-Explanations and limitations
Some scholars (Berman) assert that demand-side explanations don’t account for the entire picture. Instead, supply-side drivers contribute to the ascendance of populism. Supply-side arguments project that the main cause of populism is the decline in responsive and effective institutions (Berman 2022, 78). In the U.S., certain trends in politics have made American democracy less responsive and increased dissatisfaction, creating “fertile ground for populism,” (Berman 2022, 79). For instance, money increasingly has a role in who has a voice in politics. The polarization of Congress creates winners and losers with little room for middle ground. Voting structures like the electoral college do not accurately reflect the perspectives of the country. Therefore, supply-side theorists assert, democratic institutions are less adept to deal with issues and less responsive to citizens. This makes citizens more prone to the anti-establishment, against-status-quo voices. If a country is strong and responsive to issues, it is more likely to remain stable unlike those that don’t and are more prone to violence and disorder (Berman 2022).
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Conclusion
Reactionary right-wing populist movements across different times and localities have recurring characteristics. They are a disaffected reaction first to economic lows and secondly sociocultural change. Successful movements are commonly driven by a charismatic actor who promises to take back power from the elite and return it to the people. Each time right-wing populist waves take shape, they erode the legitimacy of democracy, spread hateful ideology, and erode checks and balances. According to a study conducted by the Institute for Change, over 50 percent of populist leaders amend their country’s constitutions, weakening checks on executive power (Kyle & Mounk 2018). Additionally, 40 percent of populist leaders are indicted on corruption charges. Therefore, it’s pertinent to mitigate the risk of this cyclical extremism. Scholars, such as Berman, Norris, and Inglehart assert that mainstream parties should more frequently address the anxieties from the working middle class. Failure to do so validates the “populist claims that the political status quo amounted to rule by a corrupt, self-serving elite cartel and that only radical solutions could ensure real representation of “the people,” (Berman 2021).